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Resolute Ambivalence: Why Judiciaries Do
Not Institutionalize Their Decision Support
Systems1
CYRUS TATA
ABSTRACT This article considers why judiciaries appear to be reluctant to institu-
tionally legitimate judicial decision support systems. While representation of
decision processes, design, judicial ownership, the apparent neutrality of data, and
‘choice’ are all crucial to allaying judicial concern about embracing technological
support, it is suggested here that the deepest concern lies in the judicial discourse
of ‘balance’ between formal and substantive visions of justice. Outlining the
development of aggregate decision support systems, the article considers the case
of New South Wales, which has the longest established judicial decision support
system. Revealing a marked judicial ambivalence either to endorse of cially, or, to
dismiss that system the paper asks whether this ambivalence is simply a symptom
of a deeper malaise, namely a ‘jurisprudential incoherence’ in judicial decision-
making. Examining the notion of ‘jurisprudential incoherence’ in judicial thought
and behaviour, the article reveals that the assumed ‘incoherence’ of judicial
behaviour stems from a  xation with normative-philosophical justi cations for
judging, which are also convenient to mechanistic thinking about computerized
decision support. For some scholars the supposed problem of ‘jurisprudential
incoherence’ can be challenged by greater transparency in judicial reasoning and
accountability. Turning to liberal-legal models of accountability, the paper pro-
poses instead that accountability is an inescapably social practice and that the
search for a moral–philosophically coherent judicial ‘explanation’ of the discre-
tionary judicial decision process is inevitably and necessarily elusive.
Introduction
Despite the now well-established tradition of using computer technology to support
substantive discretionary judicial decision-making (e.g. Hogarth, 1971; Doob and Park,
1987; Potas et al., 1998; Hassett, 1993; Hutton et al., 1995; Tata, 1998; Zeleznikow and
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Stranieri, 1998), progress towards the institutionalization of such technology has barely
progressed (Leith, 1998; Oskamp, 1995). By ‘institutionalization’ in this context, I
speci cally mean institutional support and especially legitimation from of cial judicial
institutional authority. While ‘decision support’ systems are increasingly part of the
of cial fabric of many legal organizations (e.g. Wall and Johnstone, 1997), judicial
decision-making seems to remain relatively impervious to this trend. This article explores
why judiciaries remain both most ‘in need’ of support and yet at the same time most
uncomfortable with the idea of institutionalising such support.
At  rst blush, explanations for judicial reluctance to embrace decision support systems
might seem straightforward. For example, judges world-wide intensely value their ‘inde-
pendence’ (Malleson, 1999) and ‘ownership’ of ‘their discretion’ (Ashworth, 1995; Tata,
1998). Yet, as we shall see, even where judges initiate and feel a strong sense of
ownership of ‘their’ own system (if only as a bulwark against threats to their cherished
notion of judicial independence), there is still deep reluctance to institutionalize their own
judicial decision support system.
Another obvious explanation might be that judicial decision support systems by their
nature address decisions where there are no ‘right’ or logically deducible solutions. This
might be part of the reason why there has been very limited judicial desire to pursue into
full operation some (Tata, 1998), perhaps all (Leith, 1988), arti cial intelligence ap-
proaches. However, even where judiciaries accept the apparent legal or ideological neu-
trality of decision support systems (i.e. where they accept such systems as simply
‘informing’ the proper exercise of judicial discretion rather than governing that discre-
tion), resistance to the of cial institutionalization of the authority of decision support
systems remains strong.
How can we make sense of this deep judicial reluctance to institutionalize judicial
decision support systems which are accepted as ‘neutral’ and ‘owned’ by judiciaries
themselves? What, one might ask, are judiciaries afraid of? Do they have something to
hide? In this vein, a deep concern among legal scholars has been with the apparent
‘jurisprudential incoherence’ of discretionary judicial behaviour. Thus, one explanation
for judicial resistance is that judges do not want to institutionalize a decision support
system to inform their practice because institutionalization would only expose the lack of
an underlying coherent, jurisprudential rationale for judicial decision-making. This claim
has considerable attractions, especially to both those legal scholars and computer scien-
tists who (consciously or not) seek to explain judicial behaviour through a ‘legal–
analytical’ approach. In this context a legal–analytical approach views discretionary
decision-making as essentially governed or governable by formal rules and principles with
legal cases being essentially a combination of discrete ‘factors’. Thus, institutionalization
becomes more realistic when judges are more jurisprudentially coherent. I propose
to examine these claims. I wish to ask the reader to consider the judicial job of doing
justice as perhaps less about the application of normative theory or formal rule
application to a speci c argument or situation than is often supposed by a ‘legal–
analytical’ approach. By way of contrast, I will suggest that the job of judgement is as
much, if not more, a performance communicating to a range of different audiences
a judicial discourse about an irresolvable tension at the heart of modern law. To put
the point another way: the reluctance to institutionalize is less an attempt to conceal
jurisprudential incoherence but more about judicial self-perception and its discourse
of ‘balance’ between two visions of justice which modern, liberal law has to
straddle.
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Let us examine now speci c experiences in the judicial attitude to the institutionalization
of their own decision support systems.
Aggregate Information Systems to Support the Use of Judicial Discretion
Probably more than any other area of judicial decision-making, sentencing represents one
of the most dif cult,2 high-pro le and challenging activities. Mindful of judicial axioms that
sentencing is an ‘art not a science’ and that judges are best equipped by knowledge of ‘all
the facts of each unique case’3 to determine sentence, much of the research aimed at
developing judicial decision support systems has involved aggregate information systems.
Although there have been attempts to produce information systems based on case-based
reasoning or indeed expert systems none of these has as yet become substantially and
routinely operational (and thus a candidate for institutionalization). Rather than being
derived from the logic of expert systems, which might aim to produce a single answer to
a problem, aggregate sentencing information systems aim to provide a  exible means by
which judges can explore the normal patterns of sentencing practice in similar cases.4 Below
I brie y examine the history and progress of these aggregate information systems for
sentencing. The longest-established and most of cially entrenched system operates in New
South Wales, Australia. This article reveals the carefully crafted ambivalence of the New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal towards any institutional legitimation of the
authority of the Judicial Commission’s Judicial Information Research System. Critically
considering a liberal–accountability interpretation for this judicial ambivalence, the article
suggests instead an alternative understanding of accountability as an inescapably social
practice.
The idea of providing sentencers with information on what their colleagues have done
when faced with similar cases is not a new one. In 1953, Norval Morris suggested that trial
judges be provided with data on sentences imposed so that judges could ‘see clearly where
they stand in relation to their brethren’ (Morris, 1953, p 200 quoted in Frase, 1997, p 366).
However, it was not until the 1980s that systems were implemented in Canada by John
Hogarth in British Columbia (Hogarth, 1988) and by Tony Doob in other Canadian
provinces (Doob and Park, 1987; Doob, 1990) both of which were later abandonned.
Following this there have been two jurisdictions which have implemented an SIS and
interest from a number of other jurisdictions.
New South Wales
The New South Wales (NSW) Sentencing Information System (SIS) is administered by the
Judicial Commission of New South Wales. Established in 1986 by Parliament, the functions
of the Commission are three-fold: to investigate complaints made against Judicial Of cers;5
to promote consistency of approach in sentencing; and to provide continuing judicial
education (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 1996). The SIS is now a discrete
component of a larger ‘Judicial Information Research System’ (JIRS), which also includes
components on industrial, land and environmental law. None the less, the SIS remains the
most sophisticated and signi cant of the modules. All NSW Judicial Of cers are connected
to the JIRS and the SIS contains a Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) Judgements Compo-
nent containing over 3,000 full-text judgements mainly dating from 1990. Cases can be
retrieved by case name or by a word search. Allied to this is a CCA summaries component
retrieving summaries prepared by staff of the Commission. A hypertext link allows the user
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to view a ‘sentencing principles’ database which is also prepared by the staff of the
Commission. One of the earliest components developed is thought to remain to be the most
commonly used: the Sentencing Statistics Component. This in turn is split into Local Court
data (with around 170,000 cases over the past two years), and Higher Courts’ (District and
Supreme Court) data with around 20,000 cases over the last six years. Other SIS compo-
nents include a legislation; a Facilities Component (concerning the availability of various
services and disposals), and a Sentencing Date Calculator (used to calculate the exact date
for the commencement and ending of minimum and additional custodial terms).
Scotland
Partly inspired by a demonstration of the NSW SIS in 1993, the senior judiciary of the High
Court in Scotland embarked on an attempt to develop a Scottish SIS. This contains mainly
numerical information over the previous seven years with over 6,000  rst instance cases and
all decisions of the Appeal Court concerning sentence. The system has completed its  rst
phase of implementation and evaluation in which it was piloted for up to 18 months by 18
High Court judges (Tata et al., 1997; Hutton et al., 1996). A second phase of implemen-
tation and evaluation is now underway and this will include the development of summaries
of all Appeal Court judgements concerning sentencing and the recording of short text
written by  rst instance sentencing judges to complement the information presented in
numerical form. Unlike the NSW SIS, the Scottish system has no of cial institutional home.
It is essentially an unof cial collaboration between the senior judiciary and academics at
Strathclyde University’s Centre for Sentencing Research. While this allows considerable
advantage in that creative solutions can be found to judicial concerns rather than simply
being tied to of cial recording practices, it also leaves the Scottish project vulnerable to
resource pressures and changes in judicial leadership.
The Netherlands Prototype
A prototype system known as NOSTRA has been under construction in the northern
regions of The Netherlands. An ‘input’ subsystem in which court clerks collect the data has
already been built and is being tested in three courts. The system is limited in scope to
around 600 cases of offence categories which, in terms of sentencing, are thought to be
relatively uncomplicated. The initiative shown by judges is attributed, at least in part, to
judicial concern that if judges themselves do not make efforts to encourage consistency in
sentencing then the powerful of ce of the Public Prosecutor (Downes, 1988; Goriely et al.,
1997) will try to commit them to its sentencing guidelines (van der Vinne et al., 1998)
Schild’s Prototype Intended for Israeli Judges
In Israel there has also been academic interest (Schild, 1998) in developing some kind of
computer decision support system for judges. More recently the Israeli government has
decided to request proposals for the development of a database of previous sentencing
practices based mainly on numerical data derived from of cial police data-sets (Schild,
1998).
Local Initiatives
In addition to jurisdiction-wide programmes of communicating aggregate information to
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sentencers a variety of informal, ad hoc initiatives occur at local levels. Redbridge
Magistrates Court in England, for example, has provided magistrates with an ‘audit’
(known as ‘The Redbridge Examiner’) of their sentencing practices (e.g. Faraway, 1997)
which provides local magistrates with bulletins of aggregate information on their sentenc-
ing practices. The Hampshire Probation Service has worked with the local magistracy to
produce a ‘sentencing matrix’ which aims to be a ‘guide to structured decision-making’
(Hampshire Probation Service, 1994). To say that these kinds of initiative are in one sense
amateurish is not pejorative. Indeed this kind of local ad hoc initiative enjoys strength in
its informality and ‘ownership’ (and thus acceptance) of such feedback (Ashworth, 1997b),
but of course it also suffers from the weakness that it may not be institutionalized or as
systematic as its own authors may wish. The apparent competition between the interests of
systematization and institutionalization as opposed to informality and local judicial owner-
ship is discussed elsewhere (Tata, 1998).
Thus it is possible to detect a growing judicial interest in the development of aggregate
sentencing information systems. This is explicable in terms of the way in which legislative
guidelines are presented and how SISs present themselves. An SIS is normally seen by judges
as a way of heading off pressure for the imposition of guidelines. While legislative
guidelines are seen by judges around the world as limiting choice, ownership, and penal
neutrality, SISs emphasize values of judicial choice, ownership, and neutrality (Tata,
1998a). In one sense an SIS appears to achieve the same purpose as legislative guidelines,
i.e. promoting aggregate consistency vision of justice based (in Weberian terms) on a formal
rational vision of justice at the expense of an individualized vision of justice based.
However, the means make a difference to the ends. By developing an SIS emphasizing
values of judicial ownership, choice, and, neutrality, an SIS is only useful to judges if it is
able to be drawn upon by judges as a resource to legitimate both of these visions of jusitice.
In other words an SIS is attractive to judges precisely when it is able to straddle these two
visions of justice. In thinking about issues in the provision of aggregate data to sentencers
a judicial performance which emphasizes the ‘balance’ between these two competing
images of structure in sentencing (‘individual case’ ‘versus the tariff’) is implicitly played
out.
Institutional Judicial Legitimation
Although they have generated rather less judicial resistance and political controversy than
numerical and narrative guideline structures, the provision of aggregate data to judges is
none the less inevitably an attempt to structure (in perhaps a voluntary fashion) the
sentencing process. The increasing affordability, versatility and usability of computer
technology means that computers are an increasing part of the furniture of the courts (The
Times 22 July 1996). Judges and lawyers now appear to be more reluctant to dismiss the
use of computers in legal and judicial practice. Rather, Information Technology is now
increasingly perceived to be consonant with power and independence, and in private
practice (from where many judges in the common-law world come) as a ‘ … corporate
virility symbol …’ (Wall and Johnstone, 1997). As managerialist pressure builds on of cials
who administer the courts (Bottoms, 1995) to provide evidence of the ef ciency, effective-
ness and economy (Jones, 1995), so there is perceived to be an imperative to invest in
computers to perform a variety of tasks. Coupled with judicial anxieties about indepen-
dence in sentencing, it becomes possible to anticipate that the courts will come under
increasing scrutiny to both justify value for money and to explain how judges are
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responding to concern over disparity. The question is likely to develop from ‘could we
introduce aggregate information systems?’ to ‘if other jurisdictions are introducing infor-
mation systems then why isn’t ours?’ Yet despite this momentum judges have been deeply
reluctant to institutionally legitimate judicial decision support systems.
Lack of Institutional Authority in Canada
Re ecting on an earlier failed attempt to introduce a Sentencing Information System in
Canada, Tony Doob has explained that individual sentencers operate within an environ-
ment which does not reward attention to ‘current practice’. Judges do not feel a need to
obtain information about ‘normal practice’ except, paradoxically, where they are faced
with ‘an unusual case’! He found that there were ‘ … no indications in any provinces other
than Saskatchewan that a reasonable number of people used the system’.
Essentially, then, Doob has argued that from his experience and also, he implies from a
similar fate met by Hogarth’s earlier system, judges do not perceive there to be a need for
this kind of information about ‘normal practice’ (i.e. an aggregate consistency image of
structure). Since judges cannot be coerced into paying attention to such information
systems, then judges do not perceive a ‘need’ for such information. In large part this is
because the system carried no institutional authority. It is the Court of Criminal Appeal to
which judges pay attention. Doob’s argument that sentencers ‘do not care to know’ what
is current practice because ‘current practice carries no weight’ compared with that of
Appeal Court judgements? (Doob, 1990, p 5). Is it inevitable that aggregate information
about ‘normal practice’ will be ignored by judges because such practice has no authority?
Doob suggests that if information systems are to be felt to be necessary by judges then it
is crucial that they are institutionally legitimized:
Our experience in Saskatchewan, where the project seems to be most successful, suggests
that it is important to have the system ‘legitimized’ by a part of the system that has the
authority to do this. I am reasonably sure that it is very important that the prime
authority for our involvement in Saskatchewan is the Court of Appeal. (Doob, 1990, p
12)
Without its support and legitimation, decision support systems are in a precarious and
vulnerable position. To what extent has this experience been repeated in the longest
established Judicial Decision Support System: that run by the New South Wales Judicial
Commission?
Institutional Legitimation: Experience in New South Wales
To what extent has this institutional involvement been possible in NSW and Scotland? In
Scotland the initiative for the SIS came from the Lord Justice-Clerk, the second most senior
judge in Scotland, with the support of the Lord Justice-General and a number of other
senior (Appeal) judges. However, while it has enjoyed this informal senior judicial support,
the system has not yet been referred to by the Court of Criminal Appeal and its current
status is as an informal, private judicial aid being piloted by judges. While the initiative for
the system in NSW has been clearly distinct from that in Scotland, NSW has now built up
some experience of the formal institutional attitude of the Appeal Court towards the
provision of aggregate data on current normal practice. Wetherburn and Lind (1996) argue
that given the traditional reliance on appellate review in sentencing, ‘ … the response of the
Resolute Ambivalence 303
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal is likely to prove to pivotal in determining its usage’
(Wetherburn and Lind, 1996, p 162).
However, the response of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has been marked by a deep
ambivalence. The system has been available to both prosecution and defence (albeit on a
rather limited basis—see section on access below). There is now reported to be quite a
number of Court of Appeal Judgements since 1992 which have made some (mostly minor)
reference to aggregate information drawn from the system and normally tabled by the
defence or prosecution. Some judgements articulate the claim of ‘individualized’ sentencing,
that it is not reasonable to compare previous sentences to the one at hand, because of the
case’s ‘uniqueness’. Wetherburn and Lind (1996) remarked that, ‘[a]t this stage the court’s
attitude to the SIS could best be described as lukewarm’. For example,6 in Sams (Kevin
James) NSW CCA 14 May 1997 the Court states that it was:
… unpersuaded by the submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive. [Counsel]
has referred to some sentencing statistics in his argument before the Court but I must say
that I do not  nd them helpful in this case. (Studdert J)
There was no further explanation of why such aggregate information is not found ‘helpful
in this case’. However, in another judgement in a Crown Appeal on the same day the same
judge in Ross (Steven) NSW CCA 14 May 1997 stated:
I must say I have been troubled by this appeal because the sentence was so plainly a
lenient one.
Essentially, though, the success of the appeal depended upon the Crown establishing that
in all the circumstances the sentence was manifestly inadequate. In this regard the Crown
case was not assisted by sentencing statistics produced to the Court. Those statistics did
not illustrate that the sentence here imposed was outside the range. Of course caution has
to be used in resorting to such statistics and an appeal cannot be determined simply by
reference to statistics of the nature provided here. (Studdert J)
Here, there seem to be two explanations for the Crown case having not been ‘assisted’ by
the aggregate information produced. One explanation suggests that those  gures did not
show that the original sentence was ‘outside the range’. What is intriguing about this
statement is not only that it makes no attempt to explain how ‘the range’ is recognized, but
also that the wording studiously avoids implying that the Court either paid attention, or,
did not pay attention to the statistics: merely that the Crown’s case was ‘not assisted’ by
them. A second explanation seems to lie in the allusion that ‘ … an appeal cannot be
determined simply by reference to statistics of the nature provided here’. Thus there
appears also to be concern about the nature of the information, i.e. the ability of the NSW
system to provide genuinely similar cases.
This appears to be a rather different criticism from the ability of such systems in
principle , to retrieve similar cases as the Canadian experience outlined by Doob might lead
one to believe. ‘[With some exceptions,] my impression is that the six or so “factors” that
we arrived at were in very important ways adequate to describe what was a like case’
(Doob, 1990, p 5).
However remarks made by Hidden, J. in Duncombe (David Ian) NSW CCA 11 April
1997, suggest that there may be some (at least apparent) concern with the representation
of similarity in the NSW system:
[Counsel] submitted that the effective sentence was manifestly excessive in the light of
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Judicial Commission sentencing statistics for the relevant offences and some authority of
this Court. Broadly summarised, the statistics show that full-time custodial sentences for
offences of receiving stolen property outside the state, and accessory after the fact of
larceny of a motor vehicle, are the exception rather than the rule. Frankly the  gures are
of little use as they are based on a small sample of cases and tell us nothing of the
circumstances of them. Both offences embrace a wide variety of activities and frequently
do not involve the type of calculated dishonesty characteristic of the applicant’s crimes.
If these explanations are to be taken at face-value then it appears that the Court of Appeal
may ignore aggregate data not so much ‘because current practice carries no weight’ (Doob,
1990) but because the system’s representation of the similarity of practice may be felt to be
inadequate. However, in a judgement passed early in the system’s history the Court of
Appeal, while indicating its scepticism about the system’s ability to identify reasonably
similar cases, none the less implicitly acknowledged the value of such aggregate infor-
mation:
… [W]hat is clear from those [appeal] cases, and from  rst instance decisions available
from the Sentencing Information System, is that a total sentence of  ve years and nine
months for a single charge of supplying amphetamines—even where there is trading
involved—is well outside the usual range (which is necessarily a wide one). (Hunt CJ at
CL, Hawes (Terrence Robert) NSW CCA 18 February, 1992)
Once again, the concept of a ‘usual’ or ‘normal range’ is inescapable in making the
necessarily comparative judgements in sentencing, but there is no attempt to articulate
what the range is (where it begins and ends) and how it is arrived at. Of particular
pertinence is that the Court stated that it used aggregate data to structure (or at least
rationalize) its decision. Of further signi cance, however, would be institutional support
and defence of the system. Perhaps in this regard, the judgement in Mayne (John Reginald)
NSW CCA 20 December 1996 may be seen as something of a landmark:
In his remarks on sentence his Honour gave short shrift to the submission that he should
take into account statistics or sentencing information prepared by the Director of Public
Prosecutions or the Judicial Commission. His Honour said: ‘I regard such an exercise as
of limited use and perhaps even a barren exercise of judicial time in order to produce a
false and misleading guide. In my view each case is dependent upon its own facts’.
Perhaps aware of the irony, the Appeal Court then immediately goes on to outline how the
 rst instance sentencer referred to various comparable previous Court of Appeal decisions
(which, of course, undermines the  rst instance sentencer’s claim that his approach is to
deal with “‘each case [a]s dependent upon its own facts”’). The judgement continues by
congratulating the  rst instance judge on taking into account what the Court of Appeal had
said in ‘similar cases’, and then turns to his criticism of aggregate data:
However, with respect to his Honour, his Honour should not in my opinion have been
so dismissive of the information about sentences imposed for the offence of breaking
entering and stealing which had been prepared by the Judicial Commission. … It is of
course true that the sentence to be imposed in any particular case depends on the facts
of the case. It is also true that care needs to be exercised in using sentencing statistics or
information about sentences imposed in other cases. However, it is not the case that
consulting statistics or information about sentences have been recently passed for the
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same kind of offence as the judge is sentencing for, is always, or even usually, a barren
exercise or a waste of judicial time. Consulting such statistics or information can be
useful to a sentencing judge.
The judgement then goes on to refer to an ‘inspection’ of the SIS and  nds that the  rst
instance sentence was excessive since it was ‘ … outside the range of sentences within a
sound exercise of his Honour’s discretion’ (James J).
This may be seen by the Judicial Commission as an important institutional support and
defence by the Appeal Court from attack on the value and status of the SIS from  rst
instance sentencers. However, it is also worthy of note that another one of the appeal
judges added the remark (amongst other remarks) to that judgement that:
I would not wish to be taken to agreeing, and I don’t think it follows from what his
Honour says that this is the case, that a sentencing judge must always subordinate his or
her views as to the appropriateness of a sentence to the material that is generated by the
computers of the Judicial Commission. (Bell, AJ)
The language is disparaging. It is as if, despite all the Judicial Commission’s efforts to
convince judges otherwise, a judicial belief persists that the SIS data are arti cially
manufactured or ‘generated by the computers’ rather than (as the Commission suggests) a
simple tool displaying familiar information in an unfamiliar form.
What is perhaps most striking about the attitude of the NSW CCA to the institutional
legitimation of aggregate information has been its equivocation and reluctance to commit
itself to the authority of such information. The ambivalence is explicit and resolute. To
paraphrase: consultation of aggregate sentencing information is neither a futile nor mis-
leading exercise nor is it necessarily always useful! Quite when it is relevant and when not
depends, it is said, on the particular circumstances of the sentencing decision. Quite what
the circumstances are which determine relevance is not illuminated. In other words, the use
of the NSW SIS by the CCA is that it can be used sometimes and not at others. It is used
as a selective resource to maintain and legitimate a balance between two visions of justice
in judicial discretion: between aggregate consistency and individualized judgement.
Thus the introduction of the use of aggregate sentencing information may not necessarily
mean that the balance is tipped towards the aggregate consistency vision of justice as
opposed to the individualized vision of justice. Indeed, the most appealing quality of
aggregate information systems to judicial opinion seems to be their ability to be used to
justify simultaneously both visions of structure and thus maintain a discourse of ‘balance’
between these two competing visions of justice. Thus, the way in which information is
presented by such systems is vital to their credibility. The appeal to judges of such systems
tends to lie in the ability to justify the maintenance of a discourse of balance between these
two visions. In this sense the appeal lies in the ability to leave the balance between the two
visions undisturbed.
Judicial Institutionalization Through Routine Prosecution and Defence Use?
So far all of the information systems have been primarily intended for the use of sentencers.
A critical issue concerns the access to aggregate information systems. Will wider access
encourage greater CCA resolution either to legitimate clearly or dismiss the value of
aggregate SIS data? The NSW Judicial Commission has allowed access to its SIS to the legal
profession. Although the system has been available to the Law Society, Legal Aid/Public
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Defender’s Of ce, Bar Association, and the DPP, only a very limited number of terminals
has been provided. In practice, public access and mass media access have not been
encouraged. However, following the re-engineering of the NSW SIS to form part of the
Commission’s new JIRS, negotiations for licensing the system to the profession are
underway.
It may be expected that the licensing of the system to the profession will mean that
reference to it in court will become a matter of daily routine. It will be dif cult for
sentencers to ignore information tabled from the system on a daily basis. One of the
arguments that had been used in favour of the SIS was that it could result in the reduction
in the number of appeals against sentence. The argument has run that defence lawyers
would be able to see the ‘normal range’ of sentences passed in similar cases and most
defence lawyers, having seen that the  rst instance sentence was within the ‘normal range’,
would abandon the ‘futile’ appeal against sentence. Given the very limited access which the
profession has experienced to date, it has of course been dif cult to test this hypothesis.
However, with the introduction of licensing this theory can be tested, but it is dif cult to
see how, in itself, defence access to the system will result in a reduction in the number of
appeals. Indeed it might just as well result in an increase. For one thing, what is ‘the normal
range’? A range implies limits, yet as we saw earlier, judges have been reluctant to de ne
its limits. In one case in NSW the Appeal Court came close to attempting a de nition and
then retreated:
McInerney, J in Sammak (Ali) NSW CCA 2 September 1996 remarked that:
‘The Crown has helpfully provided statistics obtained from the Judicial Commission’s
Sentencing Information System for the period January 1990 to August 1995. Without
going into these statistics in detail, it would appear that in terms of minimum or  xed
term sentences for this offence, generally a minimum term of eighteen months falls
within the top 12 per cent of cases.
The Crown submits, therefore, that this falls within the range but is at the very top
of the range’.
An interesting addition to the NSW SIS is the inclusion of an option which allows the user
to identify cases which fall within 80% of ‘the range’. Once this is selected it is interesting
to note how closely this begins to appear to be like a  exible numerical guideline approach,
although of course without any of cial sanction.
It is dif cult to imagine defence lawyers (at least where fee structures do not encourage
it7), simply looking at one display of the system and accepting it. Rather, the defence would
presumably wish to manipulate the choices selected so as to show that the  rst instance
sentence was abnormal. In a sense this is what defence lawyers in appeals against sentence
try to do already (i.e. argue that according to a certain construction of similarity the
sentence is outside the range). The greater the degree of  exibility in the system to create
displays for different case types the easier it will for defence lawyers to use the system to
support appeals against sentence. Ironically,  exibility (in any kind of approach to
structuring sentencing) is something which judges world-wide appear to favour, and (as in
the highly  exible Scottish system) could lead to more appeals (which, as was seen earlier,
is, of course, one of the main indicators which judges prefer to use for evaluating their own
sentencing performance!). However, it is conceivable that the system could assist in the
reduction in the amount of judge-time spent on appeals, but not in itself. Aggregate data
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systems could be used by an appeals  ltering body to determine ‘futile’ appeals which are
patently ‘within the range’.
We have seen that the Judicial Commission of NSW is taking its  rst steps towards
licensing the JIRS. In Scotland, where judges have a more informal, yet direct, control over
their information system, public access questions are eyed anxiously. While the information
system is being implemented progressively it is not institutionalized and this allows wider
access to be denied at least for the time being. On the one hand it is accepted that much
of the information provided is a matter of public record (or at least was at one time), but
on the other there is deep anxiety that the system could be used to help to present a slanted,
censorious impression of judges. The two visions of justice in modern law in perennial
tension are manifested in two visions of justice in judicial discretion.
Is this judicial ambivalence, manifested in both institutional status and public access
questions, simply indicative of a characteristic lack of judicial clarity and openness in
disclosing what motivates judicial thinking ?
Is Judicial Ambivalence Symptomatic of ‘Jurisprudential Incoherence’?
Aggregate information systems are conceived with one main explicit purpose: calculating
the tariff. In his imaginatively critical article about sentencing information systems, David
Tait (1998) argues that there are alternative discourses in the way in which such infor-
mation could be used, and that it is only when these alternatives are examined that the
privileged status of ‘calculating the tariff’ is revealed. While Tait opens out a series of
possibilities including hitherto ‘excluded discourses’ of punishment one of his suggestions
lies very much within conventional liberal thinking: in the ‘second generation’ of SISs, he
suggests, judges might be able to record the ‘narrative(s)’ which most in uenced thinking
in passing sentence. This would then in turn allow judges to retrieve sentencing patterns on
the basis of say, ‘just desert’, or, ‘resolving con ict’, etc. and explore the actions taken by
other judges using this narrative. This is an intriguing idea. To what extent is this an
attempt to ask judges to provide ‘reasons’ for their sentencing decisions?
The history of attempts to require sentencers to provide penal-philosophical ‘reasons’ for
sentence is not a happy one. ‘It is commonly observed that reasons are often expressed as
terse formula … rather than as thought out justi cations speci c to individual cases … In
short … reasons tend to become bland, brief and standard’ Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986, p
36). In her study of the 1982 English Criminal Justice Act and in particular Section 1(4)
which required sentencers to state the reason (e.g. protection of the public; failure to
respond to non-custodial penalties; retribution) for passing a custodial sentence on a young
person, Burney (1985) found that in 60% of the sample the reasons given were incomplete,
invalid or not given at all. ‘In a story that may be apocryphal, it [was] said that some
magistrates courts [had] rubber stamps bearing the legendary “nature and gravity of the
offence”’ (Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986, p 36, sic).
Does this failure to articulate clear, open and meaningful reasons simply re ect judicial
refusal to accept the need for openness in decision-making (Fox, 1994; Miller, 1989; Parent,
1988)? For example, Doob and Brodeur (1995, p 378) argue that the provision aggregate
information to help judges calculate the tariff is ‘fundamentally wrong. The problems of
sentencing—disparity in particular—can be seen to relate to problems of accountability’ .
Adapting the work of Day and Klein (1987) Doob and Brodeur argue that it is the lack of
a set of shared expectations and common currency of justi cations which necessarily means
a lack of substantive accountability in sentencing. To rectify this lack of accountability
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Doob and Brodeur call for a sentencing “‘theory” or a set of guiding principles on
sentencing and an explanation of how a sentence followed from the guiding principles’ (p
384). Doob and Brodeur are far from alone in calling for a more ‘coherent’ and systematic
sentencing practice (e.g. Ashworth, 1995; Henham, 1996, 1997; Fox, 1994; Hutton, 1998;
Jobson and Ferguson, 1987).
So why do judges seem to be so reluctant to be pinned down to provide a penal-philo-
sophical explanation of the sentencing decision?
A Lack of ‘Jurisprudential Coherence’?
Thus far, I have concentrated on the value of formal institutional legitimation by
Courts of Criminal Appeal. The experience to date from New South Wales suggests
that the Appeal Court has been deeply reluctant to state de nitively how and even whether
an information system should guide the  rst instance sentencing process. One and perhaps
the most likely legal academic interpretation would be that this reluctance suggests an
equivocal approach by judges and is indicative of the lack of ‘coherence’ in sentencing
(Lovegrove, 1997, 1999; Schild, 1998). Indeed the suggestion that sentencing lacks
‘coherence’ is a widely held belief and the ‘lack of theoretical coherence’ has become
even the orthodox academic wisdom. Not only is this lack of coherence an empirical
proposition it is also a normative one. It is derived from a speci c liberal paradigm
about law, justice, and discretionary decision-making. The problem is not that this
paradigm is wrong but rather that it necessarily ignores other ways of conceiving of
sentencing.
Sentencing is widely described by legal writers as ‘incoherent’ because of what might be
termed ‘the philosophical–jursiprudential test of coherence’. In other words, writers have
discovered that sentencing decisions do not seem to be methodically, logically, or accurately
derived from ‘sentencing theory’. By sentencing ‘theory’ it is invariably meant philosophi-
cally derived justi cations for punishment. For example, any given decision or set of
decisions which do not seem to follow ‘principles’ , such as retribution, denunciation,
reparation, general deterrence, individual deterrence, and so on. In their written judgements
judges frequently explain their decisions using these philosophically derived terms. Yet,
time and again legal scholars demonstrate that both individually and/or collectively judicial
logic is  awed; that their application of the aims of punishment is faulty; and that there is
no coherent or principled sentencing policy.
It is worth exploring brie y the assumptions made by this philosophical– jurisprudential
test of coherence. To some, it may seem strange to pre x the word jurisprudential with
‘philosophical’ . Indeed, it is common for AI writers to assume that theory about law means
jurisprudence which means the philosophy of law (e.g. Gray, 1997; Yannopoulos, 1998;
Lovegrove, 1997; Susskind, 1987; Schild, 1998; Zeleznikow and Hunter, 1994; Zeleznikow
and Stranieri, 1998). However, Alldridge (1997), for example, takes Suskind’s widely read
work The Future of Law to task for its anachronistic understanding of the  eld of
jurisprudence and in particular ignoring the crucial contribution of the sociology of law
(or sociological jurisprudence). While Suskind’s book is not mainly about decision
support systems, Alldridge’s critique is of the remarkable lack of awareness or understand-
ing in the computers and law  eld of the long tradition of the sociology of law and its
indispensable contribution to legal theory. Alldridge makes the point that much of the
writing to date in computers and law has been sustained by a highly positivistic and
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doctrinal characterization of philosophical jurisprudence. This is, Alldridge explains, not so
much a matter of accident but of easy convenience:
If you are going to use computers in legal contexts, the pressure which computers
generate is towards a rule-bound framework, because it is what they do best. … The link
is a contingent one—there is no logical one, but a practical one. (Alldridge, 1997, p 4)
‘Computers and law’ thinking has been nourished by an easy mechanical, behaviourist,
‘black box’ (if p then q) approach to legal discretion (‘a highly formalistic positivism’).
Empirical and normative visions of a legal discretionary decision-making process
as an essentially mechanical activity (albeit a complex one) is the most convenient
vision for many builders of legal decision support systems. Even if it is appreciated
that the exercise of legal discretion may not be analytical, sequential or reducible to
algebra (Leith, 1998), the normative argument can still be run that it can and ought to
be. In this regard a convenient characterization of legal theory as philosophy of
law (and a restrictive version at that) is invoked to try to sustain this formalistic
positivism.
Dworkin’s apparently simple distinction between rules and discretion is often employed
to justify discretion as a problem: arbitrary, incoherent, capricious, order-less. Perhaps the
most favoured image of discretion which both legal formalists and computer-come-cogni-
tive scientists have is that of Dworkin’s celebrated doughnut analogy which neatly captures
the attempt to counterpose ‘rules versus discretion’ so favoured by much of the writing in
computers and law. ‘Discretion, like the hole in the doughnut, does not exist except as an
area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction’ (Dworkin, 1977, p 31). In this image
discretion is seen as a residual area of rules and signi cantly an open space (a hole of
nothingness) in the doughnut of order. Discretion is opposed to formal rules, order and
government. If there are no formal rules then there is discretion which is easily seen as a
void, a space in which there is hole in order. ‘ … [T]here is a danger that “discretion”
simply becomes a residual category for unexplained variance …’ (Smith, 1981, p 61). If we
cannot understand or explain behaviour and reasoning then it is easy to simply see it as
some mysterious, ungoverned chaos which needs to be restrained and controlled. However,
the sociology of law points towards a different understanding of the nature of legal
discretion. Rather than regarding formal law as the main source of order, a sociological
approach demonstrates that formal law in fact is only one among many in uences on
behaviour and may often be marginal or even irrelevant to social order. Rather than the
starting point of formal legal rules derived from philosophical–jurisprudential principles,
the process of discretionary behaviour can be understood none the less as patterned and
predictable. The use of legal discretion can then be appreciated as an inescapably social
practice. In this way we might better understand legal ‘discretion’ as largely a chimera:
there may be technical–legal space for substantive choice but that choice is substantially
determined and governed by informal, social-behavioural, codes of expectations (contex-
tual social ‘rules’).
So, given insight from the sociology of law and its rich empirical literature over the last
50 years, how should we understand judges’ apparent reluctance to explain coherently their
sentencing approach? First, we should question the easy assumption that because judicial
behaviour does not conform to legal principles and ‘the philosophical jurisprudence test’
that behaviour is therefore order-less, chaotic, incoherent, and unpredictable. For many
writers the lack of coherence they identify in sentencing is a legal–philosophical incoher-
ence: in particular an incoherence in judicial explanation for sentence in terms of the
C Tata310
moral–philosophical ‘justi cation’ for punishment. This incoherence is, as Doob and
Brodeur argue fundamentally a lack of accountability. However, this is to conceive of
judicial accounts as mere mechanistic reports of ‘what happened in their mind’. I would
suggest instead that the reason why, judges’ explanations are so wanting according to the
philosophical–jurisprudential yardstick is because their judicial explanation is essentially a
socially pragmatic exercise.
Writing about the news media as an integral part of criminal justice, Ericson (1995)
argues for two conceptions of the notion of ‘accountability’ . One view is of accountability
as entailing an obligation to give an account of activities within one’s ambit of responsi-
bility. This we might call ‘liberal-legal accountability’ with its concern for chains of
command and requirement to give an explanation of one’s actions to a superior. Another
understanding has led to the coinage of the term,
account ability: the capacity to provide a record of activities that explains them in a
credible manner so that they appear to satisfy the rights and obligations of accountabil-
ity. Clearly, the formal obligation to give an account does not ensure uniformity in the
ability to give an account. The ability varies, for example, by what has to be accounted
for; who makes the demand …; who is the intended audience …; and the spatial, social,
cultural and communications format capacities to make an account. (Ericson, 1995, p
137)
‘Account ability’ is about satisfying various socially contingent needs within a sphere of
discourse. In their everyday interactions human beings are ‘re exive, knowledgeable agents
who perpetually adjust their senses of rights and obligations to organizational contingen-
cies such as knowledge resources, … political interests, authority structures, communi-
cation formats and occupational cultures’ (Ericson, 1995, p 136). In this way (and since
every account necessarily requires selection) ‘account ability’ necessarily invokes the
continual practice of revelation and secrecy.
So rather than simply seeing the giving of penal-philosophical reasons as a means of
revealing the ‘true’ or ‘real’ reasons for a decision and providing greater transparency the
focus of study is shifted onto questions of negotiation, context, perceived audience
expectations and so on. So, for example, judges should be expected to give a rather
different style of account of sentencing practice to different audiences: each other; to
themselves; academic researchers. 8 In this way, rather than seeing the provision of sentenc-
ing ‘reasons’ for sentencing decisions as a simple, posited, mechanistic action, we might
instead view reason-giving as a necessarily shifting, subtle and negotiated process whose
representation of decision-making is contingent on the social situation. Thus, reasons
which are given in open court are defensible rather than unmediated ‘truth’.
While judges tend to ‘explain’ their decisions by a mention of philosophical justi cations
for punishment after a narration of the ‘facts’ of the case, there tends to be relatively little,
if any, enunciation of how the decision process moved from ‘the facts’ to the philosophical
justi cation to the decision. Informed by Ericson’s understanding of ‘account ability’ to
sentencing, the presentation of reasons for judgements is about the performance of the role
of being seen to endeavour to ‘balance’ various interests, expectations, contexts and
audiences rather than satisfying simply the rigours of legal–analytical expectations.
This is well illustrated in the way that appeal court judgements typically perform a role
of communicating a balancing role between two competing visions of justice in the judicial
discourse of sentencing. Sentencing researchers will be well familiar with the judicial
mantra that sentencing is ‘a balance between the tariff and the individual facts and
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circumstances of each unique case’. As researchers it would be easy to scoff at the obvious
illogic of this kind of statement. First, it is not possible to use experience to judge
something which is genuinely ‘unique’. Secondly, we know from research that as in other
discretionary realms, the criminal process re-presents cases to judges as merely variants of
a limited and  nite range of standardized, typi ed plots rather than unique individual facts
(Tata, 1997). Yet, the appreciation of ‘account ability’ suggests that judgement-writing is
as much, perhaps more, about satisfying audiences and negotiating expectations (albeit
routinely and barely consciously). In this sense, then, the judicial mantra of ‘balance’ tells
us more about the performance of balance which judges are trying to communicate than
some supposed transparent revelation of reasoning to come to a decision. This balance
which judges reiterate is a judicial discourse of balance between two visions of justice in
sentencing. In Weberian terms it is a balance between ‘formal–rational’ law (in sentencing
with its concern for rational calculation, formal rules, openness and predictability) and
‘substantive–irrational’ law with its concern for individual cases and apparent uniqueness. 9
So in this way Appeal Court Judgements are able to appeal to both of these visions of
justice in sentencing. In abstract jurisprudential theory these visions are in tension with
each other and their simultaneous operation must be ‘incoherent’ . In social practice,
however, a recognition that Appeal Court Judgements necessarily are also about ‘account
ability’ means that judgement-writing becomes comprehensible as a performance of balance
between two visions of justice at the heart of modern law.
Conclusions
I have suggested that the deep reluctance and inability to provide explicitly and transpar-
ently logically reasoned judgements should not, in itself, be understood as the attempt by
a conservative judiciary to maintain mystique about the judicial decision process. It is
highly questionable that sentencers operate (or can operate) according to philosophical
theories of punishment to ‘explain’ sentencing. True, judges are normally required to
provide an account for their decisions to a variety of audiences (the court at the time; an
of cial ‘Opinion’; or sometimes to the mass media), but this is quite distinct from simply
reporting the essential unedited consciousness of thinking in deciding sentence. As scholars
of the judicial decision process, we should ask ourselves whether the judicial account for
a decision is or can be the complete,  xed explanation of judicial consciousness. Rather I
would suggest that these accounts are necessarily mediated, constructed and reconstructed
according to the audience and requirements of the ability to account for the decision.
Every act of publicity for accountability is also an act of selection and distortion in
which some things are left out and some alternative formulations are ignored … Com-
munications do not stand apart from reality. There is not  rst reality and then second
communication about it. Communications participate in the formation and change of
reality. Facts arise out of communication practices … . (Ericson, 1995, pp 137–144).
In this conception, ‘account ability’ is seen as necessarily a selective and negotiative
phenomenon rather than being about a straightforward revelation of a notional objective
truth. Inevitably, it is not possible to explain or articulate the full and unmediated pattern
of consciousness of the sentencer. Necessarily this must be a selective process mediated by
the context of giving the account.
In this light, the expectation that the judge (or indeed any discretionary decision-maker)
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ought or can apply a sentencing theory grounded in philosophical justi cations for
punishment is problematic. The account supplied by a sentencer cannot be a simple
re ection of how she structured the decision, but necessarily was socially mediated by the
particular context.
The point is that there are always competing audiences, expectations, purposes, revela-
tions and secrecy. To expect or suppose as Lovegrove (1999, p 67) most emphatically does,
that judges’ explanations are some open, full comprehensive revelation of their conscious-
ness seems to assume the judge as a ‘black-box’ machine, albeit a sophisticated one. This
black-box conception allows for very little understanding of the social production and
organization of justice as opposed to a cognitive and ultimately mechanistic model of
judicial thought.
The marked judicial ambivalence towards the institutionalization of aggregate decision
support systems seems at least in large part to be driven by a concern to be seen to perform
a role which balances formal and substantive visions of justice. A decision support system
is considered most acceptable when it is regarded by judges as  exible. Flexibility allows
judges to  ip literally between these two visions of justice in their ability to ‘account’ for
their decisions: between the standard and the particular; the general and the individual; and
thus maintain a performance of careful ‘balance’—resolute in its ambivalence.
Notes
1 I would like to acknowledge the following people for their helpful comments on this article and
its ideas: Tony Doob, Simon Halliday, Neil Hutton, Ernie Schmatt, and Ivan Potas. In addition I
would like to thank the anonymous external referees of this article for their constructive
comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Second International Workshop
on Judicial Decision Support Systems (held under the auspices of the International Conference on
Arti cial Intelligence & Law), June 1999, Oslo. I am grateful to delegates for the lively and
constructive discussion which ensued.
2 By ‘dif culty’ I speci cally mean uncertainty rather than logical or technical dif culty. As typical
of discretionary judgement, dif culty lies mainly in the uncertainty of the task rather than abstract
intellectual dif culty (see van Duyne, 1987).
3 The non-sense of the oft-repeated claim that ‘each case is unique and turns on its own facts’ and
the inescapably comparative and socially constructed nature of judgement is dealt with elsewhere
(e.g. Tata, 1997; Hood, 1968).
4 The term ‘similar cases’ is of course a key issue which I have addressed at length elsewhere. See
for example, Tata (1997, 1998).
5 This term incorporates magistrates as well as judges.
6 The examples which are discussed are drawn from a search of the NSW system and are largely
unreported judgements.
7 For a discussion of recent research into the fee structures in criminal legal aid work see Goriely
et al. (1997) and Tata (1998b).
8 Paul Maharg’s critique of the Toumlin Dialogue Game reveals parallel dif culties in the context
of legal education: ‘there is curiously little agency, intentionality or context …Who is the game for,
and who will play it? In which social or legal context will it be used? If social context is essential
to law’s performative nature, which context and which audience are envisaged? These are import-
ant criteria, which affect a user’s manipulation of the model of legal practice. … there is much
more to legal argumentation than a reduction of it to formal characteristics. Toumlin may have
given us a generic description of argument, which can be applied to the product of legal argument-
ation; but does it describe the process by which expert lawyers dispute? Moreover, despite its
promise of dialogism, there is arguably little room in the Toumlin model for the rhetoric of law
as enacted in documents or in courts’ (Maharg, 2000, pp 163–164 original emphasis retained).
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9 I am using the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ in the speci c Weberian senses rather than in their
popular usage of rational as logical and intelligent and ‘irrational’ as illogical or ‘mad’. (For
further discussion on Weber’s different ‘ideal-types’ of rationality applied to sentencing see
Hutton, 1995.)
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